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Abstrak 
Penelitian ini mengusulkan model Judicial Preview yang dapat berfungsi untuk mengurangi perilaku koruptif 
dalam hal fungsi anggaran yang dilakukan lembaga legislatif. Perilaku koruptif sering terjadi dalam fungsi 
anggaran yang dilakukan oleh anggota legislatif sendiri, hal ini menjadi cerminan rendahnya kualitas lembaga 
legislatif. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian normatif, dengan menggunakan menggunakan metode 
pendekatan perundang-undangan dan pendekatan konseptual. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode deduktif 
sebagai metode analisisnya, serta menggunakan bahan hukum yang dikumpulkan melalui metode studi 
kepustakaan. Hasil dari penelitian menawarkan cabang kekuasaan yudikatif untuk dapat melakukan konsep 
judicial preview tanpa perlu mengurangi independesi yang dimiliki lembaga tersebut, sehingga lembaga 
yudikatif tidak akan ikut serta dalam political arena secara praktis. Organ yudikatif ini hanya berfungsi untuk 
melakukan tindakan hukum pada fase pencegahan sehingga permasalahan tidak kembali terjadi. 
Kata kunci: judicial preview; legislasi; penyusunan anggaran 
Abstract 
This research proposes a Judicial Preview model that aims to reduce corrupt behaviour in terms of the 
budget function performed by the parliament. Corruption behaviour often occurs in the budget 
function performed by members of the parliament is a reflection of the low quality of the legislature. 
This research is normative research, using the statute approach and conceptual approach. This 
research uses the deductive method as the method of analysis, as well as using legal material collected 
through the literature study method. The results of this research are that the judicial branch of power 
can conduct the judicial preview model without reducing the independence of the institution so that 
the judiciary will not practically involved in the political arena. This judicial organ only functions to 
take legal action in the prevention phase so that problems do not re-occur. 
Keywords: budgeting process; judicial preview; legislation 
Introduction 
Finance is a vital part of every country in carrying out its duties, functions and roles of 
the state and realizing the country's aspirations. Finance is the key for the state, so there 
needs to be a special mechanism to regulate the pattern of state finances. Indonesia regulates 
state finances through the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in Article 23 which 
specifically provides general regulations in matters of state finances. According to 
Soeriaatmadja, the provisions in Article 23 of the 1945 Constitution have legal consequences, 
namely as follows:2 
1. The budgeting process must be carried out in a transparent and accountable manner. 
Transparent and accountable means that all parties can access the process so that they are 
able to absorb as much as possible the aspirations of the community and close the gap for 
the abuse of authority. 
2. The budget that is prepared has the goal of maximizing the prosperity of the people. This 
means that budgeting is not only for the interests of the Ministries/Institutions, but must 
be aimed at Ministries/Institutions programs that are directly related to the needs of the 
people. 
                                                 
1 Faculty of Law, Universitas Diponegoro, Jalan Prof. Soedarto, Tembalang, Kec. Tembalang, Kota 
Semarang, Jawa Tengah 50275 | diastama.anggita@gmail.com 
2 Arifin Soeriaatmadja, Kompedium Bidang Hukum Keuangan Negara (Jakarta: Badan Pembinaan Hukum 
Nasional, 2010). 
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3. Budget arrangement through the prevailing laws and regulations. This then provides a 
guarantee of legality throughout the budgeting cycle from the planning stage to the 
accountability stage. 
Article 23 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution after the amendment 
stipulates that the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget Bill (RUU APBN) is proposed by 
the President to be discussed with the House of Representatives (DPR) by taking into 
account the considerations of the Regional Representative Council (DPD). This article 
confirms the people's right to determine the APBN, namely by involving the DPR to discuss 
the RUU APBN and the involvement of the DPD to be able to provide considerations. This 
APBN is actually a form of people's sovereignty.3  
In a parallel differential, the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBD) 
preparation mechanism is similar to the APBN preparation process. This can be seen in 
Article 20 of Law Number 17 of 2003 on State Finances according to the needs of the regions. 
Regional autonomy which then gives authority to regions to carry out financial management 
independently while still receiving supervision from the central government which involves 
DPRD in preparing the APBD. This can then be seen in Law Number 17 of 2014 concerning 
the MPR, DPR, DPD, and DPRD (MD-3 Law) in Article 69 which explains the functions of 
the House of Representatives (DPR), namely one of the budget functions. The same thing is 
also found in Article 316 and Article 365 which regulates the functions of Provincial and 
Regency/City DPRD.4  
APBN and APBD are regulated in Law Number 17 of 2003 on State Finance. This 
arrangement is based on an analysis of the needs of state and regional administration in 
collecting revenue.5 In fact, many corrupt acts were carried out by members of the legislature 
in budget formulation both at the discussion level and at the budget amendment.6 This 
corruptive behavior can occur because, as a whole, the budgeting process can be categorized 
as an action that is full of discretion from the compilers.7 In general, in the budgeting process, 
there are 2 (two) views on what is meant by budget politics: first, it is defined as a policy-
making process which includes the determination of income, expenditure and management 
policies, as well as financial supervision and control. Second, it is defined as a "battle of 
interests" between interested parties in the budgeting process.8 This practice often occurs in 
the budget formulation process where it is urgent to find an appropriate formulation so that 
it does not repeat itself in the future. 
Based on the introduction given above, this research then aims to create a stronger 
mechanism so as to reduce corrupt actions in the budget preparation process. This study is 
                                                 
3 Abdul Halim, Pengelolaan Keuangan Negara-Daerah: Hukum, Kerugian Negara, dan Badan Pemeriksa 
Keuangan (Yogyakarta: UPP. STIM YKPN, 2011), 67. 
4 Indonesia, 'Undang-Undang Nomor 17 Tahun 2014 tetang Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Dan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah', Pub. L. 
No.182 Tahun 2014, Pasal 20 (2014). 
5 W. Riawan Tjandra, Hukum Keuangan Negara (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2006), 29. 
6  KPK, “Laporan Tahunan Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Periode 2012, 2013, 2014, dan 2015” (KPK, 
2012 2013, 2014, dan 2015), 10-34.  
7 Mochamad Shulthoni, “Perilaku Opurtunistik Legislatif Dalam Penganggaran Daerah.,” Jurnal 
Akuntansi dan Ekonomi Bisnis 6, no. 1 (April 2017), 31. 
8 Nian Riawati, “Potensi Korupsi Dalam Kebijakan Publik: Studi Kasus Korupsi Program Penanganan 
Sosial Ekonomi Masyarakat di Provinsi Jawa Timur,” Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik 19, no. 2 
(November 2015), 154. 
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different from previous studies, there were 3 (three) previous studies that were similar to this 
study. The first study entitled "Reduction of the DPR's Budget Function in the Framework of 
Checks and Balances", was conducted by Yut Audience Yunus & Reza Faraby. This research 
discusses the concept of a democratic rule of law and checks and balances and the function 
of the executive and legislative budgets in preparing the state budget. Based on this research, 
it is known that the checks and balances function is where the government realizes the 
function of development planning and budgeting, while the DPR realizes the political 
budget function in accordance with the mandate of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia. 
The second study which is similar to this research is entitled "Implementation of the 
Legislative Function of the House of Representatives after the 2014 Election: Problems and 
Efforts to Overcome Them", conducted by Ratna Solihah, Siti Witianti. The study concluded 
that the lack of optimal legislative function carried out by the DPR is indicated by several 
things, ranging from the recruitment of legislative candidates by political parties that do not 
pay attention to the level of education, experience and capability as candidates for people's 
representatives, lack of ability or skill of the legislative members' human resources in 
understanding the substance. Laws, the DPR's working mechanism and laws and regulations 
related to their duties as DPR members have not been understood and implemented, as well 
as the inadequate use of technical and administrative facilities by DPR members in carrying 
out the legislative process. Apart from that, the factor of cooperation among DPR members 
in formulating and shaping policies, the occurrence of tug of interest in the legislative 
process in the DPR and the provisions of Law No. 17 of 2014 which regulates the duties of 
the Legislative Body, with the loss of one of the duties of the Legislative Body's authority in 
proposing a bill, which also results in the lack of legislation products produced by the DPR. 
For this reason, several things need to be done in an effort to overcome the problems in 
carrying out the legislative function. 
The third study which is similar to this research is entitled "Harmonization of DPD and 
DPR Functions in People's Representative Institutions in the Bicameral System for the 
Implementation of Checks and Balances", which was conducted by Titik Triwulan Tutik. The 
research discusses the harmonization of the functions of the DPD and DPR in people's 
representative institutions in the bicameral system. The results show that first, the DPD as a 
state institution in the bicameral system is formulated as a people's representative institution 
that institutionally has the same position as the DPR, even in terms of the character of 
representation based on regions, the DPD has a broader representation character than the 
DPR because the dimensions of representation are based to all the people in the regions. 
Second, the DPD as the people's representative institution has the same duties and powers as 
the DPR, namely having budget, legislative and supervisory functions even though it is 
limited in nature. Third, in the context of the Indonesian constitution, there is no 
synchronization and harmonization of positions and functions between the DPD and the 
DPR, this situation weakens the function of the DPD as a state institution. 
Based on 3 (three) previous studies that are similar to this study, no one has specifically 
discussed the same problems as this study. The formulation of the problem raised in this 
study is how the damage to the Legislative Institution in Carrying Out Budget Functions? 
Judicial Preveiw Model… 
131 
And how is the application of the Judicial Preview Mechanism in Budget Formulation by the 
Legislative Body? 
Research Method 
This research is a conceptual research with normative research type. The approach 
used in this paper is a statutory approach and a conceptual approach. The technique of 
collecting legal materials in this study was carried out by using literature study techniques. 
This research uses the deductive legal material analysis method, in which the legal materials 
that have been collected are classified and then conclusions are drawn from general matters 
into specific things. 
Discussion 
Malfunctions of Legislative Institutions in Carrying Out Budget Functions 
The large Indonesian dictionary explains malfunction as an existing system but does 
not work properly.9  This study defines a malfunction as a failure of the legislative system in 
the budget preparation process, where the budget preparation process is not running 
properly in accordance with statutory regulations. Broadly speaking, according to Glenn A 
Welsch, budget is defined as Profit planning and control may be broadly as defined as a systematic 
and formalized approach for accomplishing the planning, coordinating, and controling the 
responsibility of the management.10 A good budget cycle itself, according to research conducted 
by Robert Anthony, contains 3 (three) main elements, namely; Strategic planning  this 
explains that the process of determining the budget ceiling must pay attention to matters 
such as, among other things, determining work programs and policies; Management control 
the meaning is  Ensure  ceiling of funds allocated during the budget planning process can be 
used effectively11 and efficiently after being approved; and Operational control the meaning 
is effective and efficient budget execution by Ministries/Institutions.12  
The budget setting cycle defines the relationship between the executive and legislature 
as having an attachment to each other, so that the two are inseparable systems. Referring to 
the separation of powers theory and the Checks and Balances mechanism, the legislature 
provides an opportunity to control the executive and vice versa.13 Budget formulation is 
indeed carried out by two institutions which are basically separate powers from one another, 
but in its implementation, these institutions continue to monitor each other. One form of the 
checks and balances concept implemented by the government of the Republic of Indonesia is 
the budget function. The budget function in Indonesia is carried out by the legislative body 
in the budget planning stages (both R-APBN and R-APBD) together with executives.14 The 
executive, as the party that carries out the authorization function, carries out its function to 
                                                 
9 Kementrian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, “KBBI Daring Arti Kata Malfungsi,” https://kbbi.kemd-
ikbud.go.id/entri/malfungsi, 10 April 2020. 
10 Rahmani Timorita Yulianti, “Transparansi Anggaran: Suatu Upaya Efisiensi dan Antisipasi Korupsi 
di Indonesia,” Jurnal La Riba Ekonomi Islam 4, no. 2 (Desember 2010), 241. 
11 Susi Siswati, Perilaku Oportunistik Penyusun Anggaran Dan Dampaknya Terhadap Pertumbuhan 
Ekonomi Di Indonesia, Jurnal Riset Manajemen dan Bisnis 13, no. 2, (Desember 2018), 23. 
12 Lee Jr, Robert D., Ronald W. Johnson, and Philip G. Joyce. “Public budgeting systems. Jones & 
Bartlett Learning. New York: Marcel Dekker. Inc, 2020, 144. 
13 H.A. Kartiwa, Implementasi Peran dan Fungsi DPRD Dalam Rangka Mewujudkan Good Governance 
(Bandung: Universitas Padjadjaran Press, 2009), 4. 
14 Yutirsa Yunus dan Reza Faraby, “Reduksi Fungsi Anggaran DPR dalam Kerangka Checks and 
Balances,” Jurnal Yudisial 7, no. 2 (2014), 197. 
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use the budget that has been prepared responsibly along with the instruments and resources 
that they had.15 It is hoped that the mechanism that has been built in such a way will make 
the budget determination and preparation process more efficient and maximized. 
Indicators of whether the budget function is working or not will appear from how 
much change has occurred from the budget proposal submitted by the executive compared 
to the budget set or discussed by the legislative body. So far, the legislature has tended to 
accept the macroeconomic assumptions proposed by the government. Likewise, in terms of 
aggregate income and expenditure, there has not been much change.16   
The budgeting process itself is an integral part of the political process that cannot be 
separated.17 According to Garamfalvi, political corruption occurs in the budget preparation 
phase when political decisions are very dominant, by diverting the allocation of public 
resources. Meanwhile, corruption that occurs in budget execution is called administrative 
corruption because administrative decisions are more dominant. Ultimately political 
corruption will lead to administrative corruption.18 Based on this opinion, indeed acts of 
corruption can occur since the budget formulation and discussion processes carried out by 
the legislative and executive bodies. Then this will affect the legislative process carried out 
by the legislative body. Legislative institutions will create those that do not bring people's 
interests in them because of the legislative egocentricity. The formulation of a budget draft is 
often riddled with money politics.19 This is inversely proportional to the principles of 
budgeting, which include: complying with the rule of law, being fair, and oriented towards 
efficiency and effectiveness.20 
The budget as the main tool for the government to implement all its policies in the 
form of an integrated concrete plan in terms of what actions will be taken, what results will 
be achieved, at what costs and who will pay these costs.21 Political manipulation of public 
policies makes the allocation of resources in the budget ineffective and inefficient.22 Further, 
according to Martinez-Vasquez:  
                                                 
15 Abdul Rais Asmar, “Dana Perimbangan dalam Pembagian Urusan Pemerintahan Pusat dan 
Daerah,” Jurnal Jurisprudentie 4, no. 2 (Desember 2017), 3. 
16 Sulistiyowati, “Ketidakadilan DPR-RI Dalam Menjalankan Fungsinya,” Jurnal Topik Utama 39, no. 2 
(2011), 78. 
17 Yuliana Kusuma Dewi dan Herwan Parwiyanto, “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder dalam Kajian 
Penganggaran Hibah dan Bantuan Sosial Kota Surakarta,” Jurnal Spirit Publik 13, no. 2 (Oktober 2018), 
49. 
18 Garamfalvi, L, “Corruption in the public expenditures management process” (8th International 
Anti-Corruption Conference, Lima, Peru, 2013), 17. 
19 “Wakil Rakyat Penjajah Anggaran,” Majalah Tempo, Mei 2010, 5. 
20 Nunuy Nur Afiah, “Pengaruh Kompetensi Anggota DPRD dan Aparatur Pemerintah Daerah, 
Pelaksanaan Sistem Informasi Akuntansi, Penganggaran Serta Kualitas Informasi Keuangan Terhadap 
Prinsip-Prinsip Tata Kelola Pemerintah Daerah Yang Baik: Survey Pada Kabupaten/Kota di Jawa 
Barat,” Jurnal Sosiohumaniora 12, no. 1 (Maret 2010), 2. 
21 Dobell, Peter, dan Martin Ulrich, “Parliament’s performance in the budget process: A case study’,” 
Policy Matters Enjeux Publics 3, no. 5 (2002), 24. 
22 Syukriy Abdullah, “Perilaku Oportunistik Legislatif Dalam Penganggaran Daerah: Bukti Empiris 
Atas Aplikasi Agency Theory Di Sektor Publik’” (Simposium Nasional Akuntansi ke IX, Padang, 
2006), 10. 
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“Political corruption arises when politicians or senior-level bureaucrats are able to capture the 
state apparatus for their own private benefit or for the benefit of those close to them. Political 
corruption does not regularly involve the direct execution of openly illegal or fraudulent 
activities, but rather the use of political power to influence the resource allocation process or the 
regulatory framework so that private gains are obtained as a result of public power under the 
veil of “legal” means.” 23 
The high number of corruption cases committed by legislators who have a budget function is 
a concern for all circles. In order to suppress the number of corrupt actions committed by 
members of the legislature related to the budgetary function of this legislative body, the 
Constitutional Court (MK) through the Constitutional Court Verdict Number 35/ PUU-
XI/2013,24 decided to delete some of the material contained in Law Number 17 of 2003 
concerning State Finance. The Constitutional Court deleted Article 15 paragraph (5), one of 
the key articles in which corrupt acts against state finances can be carried out by legislators 
declared invalid. The enactment of Article 15 paragraph (5) of Law Number 17 of 2003 can 
then create legal crimes in such a way as to be committed by the perpetrators of these acts 
which can lead to state losses25 which unfortunately is mutually agreed upon by the 
legislative body as a legal law so that it must be implemented. This then becomes a gap in 
the legal products made by the legislature. Legal products are incompatible with the goals of 
the state because they have been infiltrated by personal and group interests. According to Mc 
Kinney, the focus point in budgeting is how to prevent state / regional finances and assets 
from being used for illegal purposes.26 This is contradict with the opinion which given the 
high possibility of corrupt acts committed by the legislature. However, there are still 
inconsistencies in the Constitutional Court Decision, namely by not immediately removing 
the material of Article 20 paragraph (5) which resembles Article 15 paragraph (5) so that the 
opportunity for evil acts committed by legislative institutions at the regional level is still 
wide open. 
Related to the chaotic implementation of the budget function carried out by the 
legislative body, it raises the view that the legislative institutions monopolize the 
implementation of the budget function through the budget body which then becomes the 
door for illegal actions. This is interpreted by the legislature as an absolute authority so that 
the legislature can then make the necessary corrections if the budget plan is deemed to have 
shortcomings. The estuary of this shift in the system towards a heavy legislative body is then 
interpreted by the legislature that the implementation of governance after the constitutional 
amendment is centered on the legislature as a representation of the people. After the verdict 
of the Constitutional Court Number 35/PUU-XI /2013 which then narrowed the space for 
the budgetary body to move in its function, the MD-3 Law in Article 112 is still a weapon for 
                                                 
23 Martinez-Vazquez dkk., Corruption, Fiscal Policy, and Fiscal Management (USA: United States Agency 
International Development (USAID), 2004), 25. 
24 Mahkamah Konstitusi, “Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 35/PUU-XI/2013,” Pub. L. No. 
35/PUU-XI/2013 (2013), 156. 
25 Indonesia, “Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2004 tentang Perbendaharaan Negara,” Pub. L. No.  5 
Tahun 2004, Pasal 15 ayat (5) (2004). 
26 Mustopadidjadja AR, “Sistem, Fungsi, dan Proses Penyusunan APBN” (BP-7 Pusat dalam rangka 
menyiapkan Tim Ahli anggota DPR-RI Golongan Karya Tahun 2013-2002, Jakarta: DPR RI, 2013), 3. 
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a person or group of people who want to commit corrupt acts.27 A similar thing can be found 
in Article 80 (J) which provides an opportunity for legislative members to submit proposals 
for selected regional programs. This can open up gaps in the phrase 'proposed area' which 
can be used as an excuse for creating line items.28 This then contradicts the spirit of 
accountability in budget preparation considering that later this Article can become a gap in 
budget preparation.29 The inter-agency checks and balances mechanism became a tool which 
was later abused by the legislative body in the budget preparation process, which in turn 
became disastrous in the entire budget preparation process where the interests were not 
necessarily contained in the budget plan. The MD-3 Law is proven to still open a gap in the 
subjectivity of the legislature to open new budget items that allow fraud to occur. 
The powerful condition that the legislature has causes the pressure on the executive to 
become even greater so that the executive seems to be “lower” than the legislature, making it 
difficult for the executive to reject legislative recommendations in allocating resources that 
provide benefits to the legislature, causing the budget outcome in the form of public services 
to experience distortion and harm the public.30 The reality is that in the process of allocating 
resources there are always conflicts of interest among the actors involved in the budgeting 
process.31 The application of the judicial preview concept in this budget cycle will then lead 
to the principle of efficiency, so that it does not require a process of cancellation of articles 
that have the potential to cause budgeting malfunctions by the legislature to the 
Constitutional Court. The authority of the Budget Agency as stipulated in Article 110 of the 
MD-3 Law can be strengthened by involving the branch of legal power to preview the 
budget plan, before the budget plan is passed. Strong political will is absolutely necessary to 
revise this Law so that this mechanism can work. 
Implementation of the Judicial Preview Mechanism in Budget Formulation by the 
Legislative Body 
The judiciary branch of power32 in the case of judgments, then this institution has 
knowledge in dealing with gaps that will arise in the budget preparation process. Law 
enforcers will have responsibility both morally and prophetically, supported by knowledge 
and legal technical capacity to carry out this preview mechanism.33 The judiciary can carry 
out its judicial function on the draft budget so that it can identify gaps in corruption that can 
                                                 
27 Indonesia, “Undang-Undang Nomor 17 Tahun 2014 tetang Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Dan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah,” Pub. 
L. No. Lembaran No. 182 Tahun 2014 (2014).  
28 Indriyani Astuti, “Mafia Anggaran, Praktik Lama, Modus Baru,” https://mediaindonesia.com/rea-
d/detail/28749-mafia-anggaran-praktik-lama-modus-baru, 10 April 2020. 
29  Siregar, Baldric, and Rudy Badrudin, The Evaluation of Fiscal Decentralization in Indonesia Based 
on the Degree of Regional Autonomy, Journal of Reviews on Global Economics 8 (2019): pp. 615. 
30 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, “Agency theory: An assessment and review,” The Academy of Management 
Review 14, no. 1 (1989), 57–74. 
31 P.M. Jackson, The Political Economy of Bureaucracy (Oxford: Philip Allan, 1982),  45. 
32 Bagir Manan, Kekuasaan Kehakiman yang Merdeka dan Bertanggungjawab Andai Saya Terpilih: Janji-janji 
Calon Ketua dan Wakil Ketua MA (Jakarta: LeIP, 2002), 13-24. 
33 Saryono Hanadi, Wiwik Yuni Hastuti, dan Alef Musyahadah Rahmah, “Tindak Pidana Korupsi 
Dalam Penyusunan APBD (Kajian Putusan Nomor 76/Pid.B/2008/PN.PWT),” Jurnal Yudisial 3, no. 1 
(April 2010), 20. 
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be proven based on law, then action can be taken against the draft and then lead to 
disapproval of the draft.34 
This method will resemble the judicial preview method or it can also be called the 
anticipatory judicial review carried out by the judiciary or other state organs appointed to 
conduct the preview, can conduct a review of the legislation before it is promulgated by the 
maker or it is still in the form of a draft law.35 According to Ni'matul Huda, the concept of 
judicial preview is a mechanism that functions to improve laws because the examination will 
be carried out thoroughly outside the institution that produces the legal product itself.36 
According to Alec Stone, the preview concept is very different from the review concept that 
has been used by the government of the Republic of Indonesia. The preview here is carried 
out when the process of a statutory regulation is still at the draft level and has not been 
officially enacted.37  According to Bivitri, within the framework of legislation, there are 2 
(two) main things that must be considered, namely substance and process.38 The preview can 
then be done not only at a substantial level, but at the ongoing budgeting cycle process. This 
mechanism will then provide stronger monitoring efforts so as to minimize deviant actions. 
As it is known, the budgeting cycle in Indonesia aims for the greatest possible 
prosperity of the people. Until now, there has been no mechanism by which the public can 
participate directly in the government process. Public participation can be an instrument for 
public officials to express the values that develop in society. In relation to the budget cycle, 
the values that develop in this society can then be interpreted as a need that develops in 
society in accordance with the dynamics that occur. Indonesia then adapted the 
representative mechanism, so that the people could participate using this method. It is 
unfortunate if the representatives who are elected directly through the general election 
method injure the main principles of the representatives themselves. According to using this 
judicial preview method, the branches of power that carry out the judicial preview can play 
the role of the people. Several reasons why this concept can represent the role of society, 
among others: 
a. Provide information to the government regarding real conditions that occur in the 
dynamics of society. The government can then capture these dynamics to process them 
into targeted policies; 
b. Community participation from the beginning, can increase the level of public acceptance 
of the policies that have been created. This will happen automatically because the policies 
that are born are policies that are effective in accordance with public needs. 
c. Provide a more certain legal guarantee. Deviant actions that occur in the budget cycle can 
then be minimized because supervision has been implemented from the start. 
                                                 
34 Nurhayati Nurhayati, Aliah Pratiwi, Puji Muniarty, Kamaluddin Kamaluddin, Opportunism and 
Internal Conflict of the Executive and Legislative in Planning and Budgeting, Advances in Social 
Science, Education and Humanities Research (Proceding, August-2020): pp. 13. 
35 Imam Soebechi, Hak Uji Materiil (Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2016), 52. 
36 Ni’matul Huda, “Judicial Preview Sebagai Mekanisme Verifikasi Konstitusionalitas Suatu 
Rancangan Undang-Undang,” Jurnal Konstitusi 11, no. 2 (Desember 2014), 640. 
37 Alec Stone Sweet, Governing With Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 24. 
38 Bivitri Susanti, Bobot Kurang. Janji Masih Terutang: Catatan PSHK tentang Kualitas Legislasi DPR 2006 
(Jakarta: Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan, 2007), 25. 
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d. Ensuring the running of the principles of democracy, where in a good democratic process, 
the prioritization of the public is everything. 
Community participation is then not only important in the process of creating a good law-
making process but also becomes an early detection instrument if there is potential for public 
loss in implementing the budget cycle.39 
The following is a concept flow chart offered by the author in relation to the judicial 
preview. This concept is then combined with the idea of a separation of powers that is 
carried out on the budget design in order to realize a check and balance mechanism which 
will completely appear as follows: 
 
 
Source: Research Results 
 
Adapting the concept of judicial preview to be used as a preventive supervision system 
in budget execution in Indonesia, it is necessary to remember that so far the judicial power 
only plays a role after the occurrence of legal problems, which later shows that the upstream 
of these problems is during the legislative process carried out in the budget draft. In such a 
case the judiciary which is deemed to have the authority to perform this preview function is 
the Supreme Court. This is because the Supreme Court already has sufficient knowledge and 
experience in criminal cases of corruption related to the budget so that with these skills, the 
Supreme Court is deemed capable of being able to close the loophole for corrupt acts in the 
budget sector. 
Conclusion 
Based on the discussion that has been described, can be concluded that implementing a 
judicial preview mechanism is one solution because the judiciary has the ability to handle 
corrupt cases in budget formulation. With the existence of the judiciary in the budget 
function does not mean depriving the independence of the judiciary by entering the political 
arena, but independence is shown by carrying out legal supervision at the preventive level. 
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Therefore, the adoption of the judicial preview mechanism is expected to be able to suppress 
corrupt actions in the budget formulation process by the judiciary. It takes a strong political 
will to be able to implement this mechanism. The implementation of this preview 
mechanism will then bring out the principle of efficiency considering that related articles that 
have the potential to cause corrupt actions do not need to be filed for annulment at the 
Constitutional Court. This mechanism can then run by revising Article 110 of the MD-3 Law 
which regulates the duties of the Budget Agency. The branch of judicial power that is most 
relevant to this concept is the Supreme Court, which is capable of having experience with 
cases of abuse in the budget cycle process. Implementation of the judicial preview 
mechanism will not only be able to return the budget cycle back to its running, but also 
increase public confidence in the legislative body. 
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